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Abstract
We use micro data on young married households from the Japanese Panel
Survey of Consumers in order to analyze the importance of borrowing con-
straints in Japan. We find (1) that 8 to 15 percent of young married Japanese
households are borrowing-constrained, (2) that household assets and the hus-
band’s educational attainment are the most important determinants of whether
or not a household is borrowing-constrained, and (3) that the Euler equation
implication is rejected for both the full sample and for the subsample of un-
constrained households. These results suggest that the life cycle/permanent
income hypothesis does not apply in Japan and that the presence of borrowing
constraints is not the main reason why it does not apply.
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1 Introduction
If the life cycle/permanent income hypothesis (hereafter LCPIH) holds, changes
in consumption should not be sensitive to changes in expected income. On the
other hand, if this hypothesis does not hold (for example, because households are
borrowing-constrained), changes in consumption will be sensitive to changes in ex-
pected income. Thus, a commonly used test of the validity of the LCPIH is to
estimate an Euler equation to see whether changes in consumption are sensitive to
changes in expected income.
If the LCPIH does not hold and the reason is the existence of borrowing con-
straints, we would expect changes in consumption to be sensitive to changes in
expected income in the case of borrowing-constrained households but not in the
case of unconstrained households. In this paper, we use micro data on young mar-
ried households from the Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers, conducted by the
Institute for Research on Household Economics, to shed light on (1) the prevalence
of borrowing constraints in Japan, (2) what households are borrowing-constrained
in Japan, (3) whether the LCPIH holds in Japan, and (4) whether the presence of
borrowing constraints is the reason why the LCPIH does not hold in Japan.
To summarize our main findings, we find (1) that 8-15 percent of young married
Japanese households are borrowing-constrained, (2) that household assets and the
husband’s educational attainment are the most important determinants of whether
or not a household is borrowing-constrained, and (3) that the Euler equation impli-
cation is rejected for both the full sample and for the subsample of unconstrained
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households. These results suggest that the LCPIH does not apply in Japan and that
the presence of borrowing constraints is not the main reason why it does not apply.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we present the theoretical model;
in Section 3, we describe the data and analyze what households are borrowing-
constrained in Japan; in Section 4, we present the results of our Euler equation
tests; and Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Consumption Smoothing
Consumption smoothing behavior is characterized by the Euler equation. We sum-
marize this, making the usual assumptions. An individual holds At of total assets at
the beginning of period t and purchases a total of Nt of assets at (the end of) t. The
individual earns a real wage of w, and spends it on the consumption of goods, c, and
the purchase of assets, N . We do not consider the individual’s leisure choice, and
assume w is exogenous. The saving constraint faced by the consumer is described as
Nt ?At = wt ? ct. The asset accumulation constraint is At+1 = Nt(1 + rt+1) where
rt+1 is the interest rate at the beginning of period t+1. All individuals face the same
interest rate, live for a finite lifetime T , and leave no bequests at T+1. Suppose that
the individual’s utility is stationary and additively separable over time and written
as Et
nPT
k=t
1
(1+?)k?tu(ck)
o
,where Et is an expectation operator conditional on in-
formation available at t, u is a function that is increasing and concave in ct and ?
is the rate of time preference, which is assumed to be homogeneous over individuals
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and time. The representative consumer’s maximization problem can be written as
a dynamic programming problem. Maximizing Vt = u(ct) +
1
1+?EtVt+1(At+1, wt+1),
we obtain the first order condition for consumption: Et
n
?ut
?ct ?
1+rt+1
1+?
?ut+1
?ct+1
o
= 0.
This is the Euler equation, implying consumption at t should be chosen so that the
expected discounted gain of saving now for the future is equal to marginal utility in
this period. Further assume that utility is isoelastic, u(cit) = c
1??
it /1? ?, where ? is
the risk aversion parameter. Marginal utility is convex and allows for precautionary
saving as a special case. If it is assumed that lnci,t+1 and rt+1 have a joint normal
distribution, the Euler equation becomes
Et? ln ci,t+1 = ??1(Etrt+1 ? ?) +
1
2
??2i,t. (1)
In the last term, ?2i,t is the conditional variance, which equals the variance of
(? ln ci,t+1 ? rt+1/?) and partly reflects uncertainty and the precautionary motive
for saving.
There are at least two ways to test the validity of equation (1). The first way is
to test a structural form, estimating utility function parameters using Generalized
Method of Moments (nonlinear instrumental variable) estimation. This is a direct
test using the Euler equation, whose error term should be orthogonal to information
before t (see, for example, Runkle (1991)). GMM estimation is beneficial in the sense
that we can avoid the approximation of linear marginal utility in consumption, the
assumption of distribution, and the assumption of income exogeneity.
However, many researchers have for a long time used another way to test the
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Euler equation implication. This is a test of the reduced form Euler equation with
additional variables in past information sets. It tests the validity of this additional
information (for example, income changes) predicted by previous information. Addi-
tional variables should not explain consumption changes if the Euler equation holds.
For example, consumption changes should not react to predicted income changes.
That is, we test whether ? = 0 in the equation
? ln ci,t+1 = ?1Ft + ?2?Xi,t+1 + ?3
1
2
??2i,t + ?? ln y
e
i,t+1 + ?i,t+1, (2)
where ? ln yei,t+1 is income predicted by individuals using the information available
to them. This is calculated as predicted values from the first stage estimation of
? ln yi,t+1. Ft is a time-varying variable including ??1(Etrt+1??). Preference shifts,
described as ?Xi,t, could a?ect the consumption plan at any point in time. The
third term is the conditional variance of the uncertain components. One of our
main focuses is to review past studies using proper data on consumption smoothing.
Thus, we conduct this reduced form exclusion test. Since our data are panel data on
households, we conduct IV estimation controlling for household-specific di?erences
by applying fixed e?ects estimation and random e?ects estimation. The null hy-
pothesis is that the Euler equation holds and that individuals smooth consumption
changes against predicted income changes. That is, ? = 0: consumption does not
react to predicted income changes.
Most past studies drop the conditional variance term, 1
2
??2i,t, simply assuming
that it is the same across individuals. It is often necessary to make this assumption
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because information is seldom available on precautionary motives, but Jappelli and
Pista?erri (2000) emphasize the importance of including this term; if we ignore this
term and if ? ln yei,t+1 is related to uncertainty or precautionary saving motives, ?
measures not the sensitivity of consumption to income but the e?ect of uncertainty
on consumption. Jappelli and Pistaferri (2000) regard nominal (observable) income
variance as a proxy for the uncertainty term ??2i,t and include it as one of the
explanatory variables.
This method could, however, be problematic for the following reasons: First,
income uncertainty is only one of many uncertainties individuals face and is not a
su?cient indicator of general uncertainty. Second, even if uncertainty consists only
of income uncertainty, using actual income uncertainty as a proxy for ??2i,t as well
as ? ln yei,t+1 may raise a problem due to the correlation between the two. Thus, we
calculate consumption variances for each household, and conduct an additional test
of the Euler equation implication controlling for this term.
2.2 Violation of Consumption Smoothing
If markets are complete and there exist appropriate securities against any future
state, each household’s consumption is fully insured against any idiosyncratic shock.
Households can smooth consumption changes completely over expected and unex-
pected income fluctuations, sharing risks with each other. Previous studies have
tested this implication of consumption full insurance and most have rejected it. Al-
though it is important to find a situation (if any) where full insurance holds, the
rejection of the implication is not surprising. A more interesting issue is what can
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and what cannot explain the violation of the implication.
For example, the existence of borrowing constraints may cause the Euler equa-
tion implication to be rejected. Many studies have, for a long time, inquired into
the existence of borrowing constraints and the di?erences in consumption behavior
between borrowing-constrained and unconstrained households. Households should
fail to smooth consumption if they encountered an unexpected shock and could not
borrow to carry out their original plans. Thus, unconstrained households should not
react to income shocks, while constrained households should react strongly. Based
on this analogy, many researchers have tested the Euler equation (e.g., Eq. (2)) and
have interpreted ? as the proportion of borrowing-constrained households.
Once we have rejected the Euler equation implication, we should seek the reason
for it, checking each possible explanation one by one. The following parts focus on
the existence of borrowing constraints, which is the most frequently used explanation
for the violation of the Euler equation implication. Specifically, we identify uncon-
strained households using unique information on households’ borrowing constraints
and test the Euler equation implication using this subsample. If the existence of
borrowing constraints is the primary explanation for the violation of the Euler equa-
tion implication, we should find evidence of the Euler equation implication for this
sample but not for the full sample. However, if other explanations for the viola-
tion of the Euler equation implication matter, we should not find support for this
implication even for the unconstrained sample. We will discuss other possible ex-
planations for the violation of the Euler equation implication later after we have
examined the empirical results for borrowing constraints.
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3 The Data
3.1 JPSC Data
This paper uses micro data from the Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers, (here-
after the JPSC) (in Japanese, Shouhi Seikatsu ni kansuru Paneru Chousa), a panel
survey conducted by the Institute for Research on Household Economics (in Japanese,
Kakei Keizai Kenkyuusho). This survey has surveyed young married and unmarried
women (those between the ages of 24 and 34 in 1993) once a year since 1993, and
this paper uses the 1993-2004 waves from this survey. Because JPSC is a panel
survey, we can calculate changes in consumption from year to year, which is pre-
cisely the variable we need to test our theoretical model. We confine our analysis to
the subsample of married women because most young single Japanese women live
with their parents and rely on their parents’ income but precise information is not
available on their parents’ income and consumption. Note that married women are
asked not only about themselves but also about other household members.
Borrowing constraints. The first and most important variable used in our analy-
sis is the one pertaining to borrowing constraints. The JPSC asks three unique
questions about borrowing constraints: (1) Have you (or your spouse) ever had a
loan application turned down? (2) Have you (or your spouse) ever had the loan
amount reduced when you applied for a loan? (3) Have you (or your spouse) ever
decided against applying for a loan because you expected your loan application to be
turned down? Following Jappelli (1990), we refer to households answering "yes" to
these questions as "rejected," "reduced," and "discouraged" borrowers, respectively.
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Households that replied "yes" to one or more of these questions were regarded as be-
ing borrowing-constrained. Unfortunately, this information is available only in the
1993 wave and the 1998 and later waves1. Thus, we had no choice but to assume
that borrowing constraints remained unchanged during years for which information
is not available. This is exactly what Jappelli (1990) and Jappelli, Pischke, and
Souleles (1998) assume, even though it may be too strong an assumption. We will
return to this point in the last part of this section.
Consumption. The JPSC collects data on consumption (living expenses) by all
household members during the month of September. In the regression analysis, we
use the growth rate of monthly consumption. The data on monthly consumption
have at least two advantages: first, they include all consumption goods and services,
unlike in the case of PSID, which collects data only on food consumption. Thus,
we need not make any assumptions about the separability of consumption. Second,
using the change in consumption between two non-sequential months has the advan-
tage of avoiding, to some extent, potentially serious problems raised by consumption
durability and habit formation2.
Income. The JPSC collects data on several measures of income, including annual
1More specifically, the wording of the question about borrowing constraints was changed slightly
starting in 2003, and it now asks only about the respondent’s experience during the previous year.
For 2003 and later, we have created a new variable that indicates whether the respondent was
borrowing constrained at any point in the past.
2The change in monthly consumption could be biased if the household engages in purchases
of big-ticket items such as homes and cars. The JPSC asks about spending on ‘living expenses’
during the previous month excluding spending on most big-ticket items. The survey asks separately
about purchases financed by loans. Thus, we can exclude the possibility that consumption growth
is overestimated as a result of purchases of big-ticket items. Unfortunately, the JPSC does not ask
for a breakdown of living expenses into durables, non-durables, and services so we cannot be sure
that it excludes durables completely, but for the reason given above, we can be reasonably sure
that it consists mostly of non-durables and services, which is what we want.
8
(total) income, annual labor income, and monthly labor income. Annual (total)
income and annual labor income are inclusive of taxes so we need to estimate taxes
in order to calculate after-tax income. We use after-tax monthly labor income in
the main Euler equation for at least three reasons: first, we wanted the period and
timing of consumption and income to match. If we use annual income, there is
a danger of underestimating the degree of consumption smoothing simply because
annual income is more stable than monthly income or consumption. Another reason
for using monthly income is that using annual income would require us to waste the
last year of data since the survey asks about annual income in the previous year.
Finally, the use of monthly labor income helps to reduce the amount of household
heterogeneity because data on monthly labor income are not available for the self-
employed. We sum the monthly labor incomes of all household members and use
the growth rate of total monthly labor income in the regressions.
Household characteristics. Following the past literature on testing the LCPIH
and the existence of borrowing constraints by estimating an Euler equation, we
include the husband’s age, the household’s consumption needs, as proxied by the
number of family members, and year dummies. Although we tried including many
other time-variant and time-invariant variables that might possibly influence con-
sumption, particularly that of young Japanese households such as those included in
our sample, all of the variables we tried including had little e?ect and their inclusion
was not supported statistically3. Time-invariant variables such as regional dummies
3For example, neither a dummy variable for those who had their first baby during the current
year, which could make a big di?erence in consumption patterns, nor a dummy variable for those
who starting living with their parents during the current year, which is often observed in Japan as
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are automatically dropped in the case of fixed e?ects estimation. We estimate ex-
pected income change using income change in the previous year and the husband’s
educational attainment as instruments and include it in the explanatory variables
for consumption.
The total number of married women (households) was about 1000 in most years.
In order to estimate the Euler equation, we kept an observation if it contained
enough information for at least a one-year panel. Thus, the sample we used is an
unbalanced panel. We calculated consumption variances using consumption values
for the past four years, and information on borrowing constraints is available for
1993 and for 1998 and later. Thus, data for 1998 to 2004 are used to test the Euler
equation implication. After eliminating observations with missing values for one or
more of the variables included in the regressions, we were left with 1006 households
(4582 household-years) in the full sample and 956 households (4133 household-years)
in the unconstrained sample4.
3.2 Who Is Constrained?
Before estimating the Euler equation, we summarize the characteristics of borrowing-
constrained households. Table 1 summarizes the borrowing motives of households
that are currently in debt. Although housing and car purchases are the main reasons
for borrowing, a few households do in fact borrow to finance living expenses. More
the parents get older, changed the results below.
4We did not drop outliers from our sample in the regression results shown in this paper. We
did try re-estimating the regressions after dropping observations whose monthly consumption and
disposable income lie outside of the "mean plus or minus three standard deviations" range, but
the results did not change qualitatively.
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than half of the sample is currently in debt, which suggests that borrowing plays an
important role in household planning.
Turning to data on the share of households that are borrowing-constrained, this
figure was 7.61 percent in 1993, 9.29 percent in 1998, and 15.40 percent in 2003.
Thus, the share of borrowing constrained households was very low in 1993, and
although it increased sharply during the 1990’s and early 2000’s, it was still less
than one-sixth in 2003.
Many past studies have tried to distinguish borrowing-constrained households
from unconstrained households. Since direct data on borrowing constraints are
usually not available, most previous studies have tried to predict who is borrowing-
constrained using a variety of indicators. In our case as well as in the case of Jappelli
(1990), however, direct information is available on whether or not a given household
is borrowing-constrained. Thus, following Jappelli (1990), we analyze what deter-
mines whether a given household is borrowing-constrained by regressing a dummy
variable that equals one if the household is borrowing-constrained and zero other-
wise on various household characteristics using probit estimation. The household
characteristics we use include assets, income, the husband’s age and educational
attainment, household size, homeownership, debt, city size, and region. We use two
measures of assets: Asset1, which is defined as holdings of bank and postal deposits,
bonds, and equities, and Asset2, which is defined as Asset1 plus life and non-life
insurance, land, and housing. Only the results for Asset1 are shown in Table 3, but
the results for Asset2 were qualitatively similar. Debt is defined as the amount of
outstanding debt. The other variables are described in the previous section.
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Table 2 shows the characteristics of borrowing-constrained and unconstrained
households separately. All borrowing-constrained households have lower assets and
husband’s educational attainment than unconstrained households and all borrowing-
constrained households with the exception of "reduced" households have lower in-
comes and husband’s employment rate than unconstrained households. "Discour-
aged" borrowers have similar characteristics to "denied" and "reduced" households.
This finding underscores the importance of di?erentiating "discouraged" households
from those completely free from borrowing constraints and grouping them together
with borrowing-constrained households.
Who is borrowing-constrained? Table 3 shows the estimation results of our pro-
bit analysis of who is borrowing-constrained for 1993, 1998, and 2003. Household
assets and income are two variables of interest since many past studies have used
the ratio of assets to income as an indicator of whether or not a given household
is borrowing-constrained, and as Table 3 shows, the marginal e?ects of the income-
related variables are statistically significant in only one of the 3 years (1998), but
the marginal e?ects of Asset and/or Asset-squared are statistically significant in all
3 years, with the overall impact of assets being consistently negative, as can be seen
from the partial e?ects on the last line of Table 35. However, we found that the
husband’s educational attainment also has a statistically significant impact on the
probability of being borrowing-constrained in the case of Japan, with college grad-
5The partial e?ect of Asset on the probability of being constrained is calculated as ?(X?) ·
(?1 + 2?2Asset+ + ?3Income+ + ?4HusAge+), where upper plus indicates the mean value and
?1,?2,?3,and ?4 are the coe?cients of Asset, Asset-squared, the cross-product of Asset and In-
come, and the cross-product of Asset and HusAge, respectively. ?(·) is the standard normal density
function, and X? is the linear prediction evaluated at the means.
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uates being significantly less likely to be borrowing constrained than less educated
households. The results are unchanged even if we utilize the panel structure of the
data and do, say, a random e?ects logit estimation using 1993 and 1998-2004 data.
Jappelli (1990) found using U. S. data that income and assets have a significant
impact on the probability of being borrowing constrained but that the husband’s
educational attainment does not, so our results for income and husband’s educational
attainment are di?erent from those for the United States. Educational attainment
could be an indicator of current as well as future income, and a household in which
the educational attainment of the husband (usually the household head and main
income earner) is relatively low might be regarded as having insu?cient ability to
repay loans.
Finally, we also tried including a number of other explanatory variables, but
their coe?cients were never significant6.
We turn now to a check of the accuracy of indicators used by previous studies
to identify borrowing-contrained and unconstrained households. Following previous
studies, we group the sample into ’hypothetically’ borrowing-constrained and un-
constrained households using various indicators and then compare these households
to ’actually’ borrowing-constrained and unconstrained households. The results are
shown in Table 4.
The first three indicators, which were originally proposed by Zeldes (1989), are
6The self-employed may need to borrow and may face borrowing constraints more frequently
than others. Also, employment conditions such as tenure and firm size often a?ect household
decisions in Japan. Thus, we conducted the estimation including variables relating to the husband’s
self-employement, tenure, and firm size, but none of their coe?cients were significant.
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the most frequently used indicators in many countries and are constructed by taking
the ratio of asset holdings to income. Since households who have adequate amounts
of assets relative to income can dissave their assets when necessary and protect
their consumption against unexpected income shocks, households with a high asset-
income ratio are regarded as being unconstrained. The first indicator is whether or
not the household’s holdings of financial assets are more than twice as much as their
monthly income, and the second one is whether or not the household’s holdings of
total assets (financial assets plus housing equity) are more than twice their monthly
income. The third indicator classifies households with no financial assets as being
borrowing-constrained and households whose holdings of financial assets are more
than twice their monthly income as being unconstrained.
The fourth indicator is whether or not the household owns one or more credit
cards. If it owns one ore more credit cards, it can finance its consumption even
when it experiences an unexpected income decline. This indicator is close to the
one suggested by Shintani (1994), who classifies households as being unconstrained
if they own one or more credit cards or one or more cards with a free-loan feature
because they need to pass a credit check in order to receive one or both kinds
of cards. The fifth indicator, proposed by Hayashi (1985b), classifies households
as unconstrained if they consume less than 85 percent of their annual disposable
income (minus all debt outstanding plus 20 percent of their financial assets).
Finally, since we found from Table 3 that educational attainment is a significant
indicator of being unconstrained, we propose a new indicator that identifies college
graduates as being unconstrained. In addition, we construct another new indicator
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that is the same as the first indicator suggested by Zeldes (1989) except that financial
assets are replaced by a broader concept of assets—namely, bank and postal deposits,
bonds, equities, life and non-life insurance, land, and housing.
Table 4 shows the results. The predicted-unconstrained/actually-unconstrained
and predicted-constrained/actually-constrained cells indicate the proportion of house-
holds identified properly. The results are summarized in Table 5. As expected, the
husband’s educational attainment identifies unconstrained households well, as does
Hayashi’s indicator (his consumption-income ratio). By contrast, Zeldes’s asset-
income ratio is better at identifying borrowing-constrained households, but even so,
about 50% are misclassified. This finding is similar to Jappelli’s (1990) finding for
U.S. households that using the asset-income ratio leads to serious misclassification of
constrained and unconstrained households, and moreover, misclassification is even
more serious in the case of Japanese households.
Thus, we should identify unconstrained households using information on educa-
tional attainment or the consumption-income ratio, but we should identify borrowing
constrained households using Zeldes’s asset-income ratio despite its limitations.
4 The Results
4.1 Euler Equation Test
In this section, we present the results of our Euler equation tests, but we first present
the descriptive statistics for the sample used in the estimation in Table 6.
Parts (a) and (b) of Table 7 are the results of IV estimations controlling for in-
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dividual e?ects using a fixed e?ects model and a random e?ects model, respectively
(see Appendix (1) for the first stage regression results). Although the Wu-Hausman
test shows that individual e?ects in the error terms are not correlated with the ex-
planatory variables so that the random e?ects model is good enough to be estimated,
the fixed e?ects model estimator is still consistent (but ine?cient) and may still be
preferred if unobserved time-invariant individual e?ects relating to the household’s
consumption and income changes are omitted from the equation. The coe?cient of
expected income is about 0.094 and 0.093 in the fixed e?ects and random e?ects
models, respectively. Both coe?cients are significant at the 1 percent significance
level. Thus, we strongly reject the applicability of the Euler equation implication.
When we control for conditional variances additionally, the coe?cients of ex-
pected income changes are still 0.097 and 0.092, respectively, in the fixed e?ects
model and the random e?ects model, and both are significant at at least the 5%
significance level. Thus, we again reject the Euler equation implication.
The coe?cient of expected income changes in (a) might be upward biased because
the process of taking the di?erence from the mean (within-estimator) to remove fixed
e?ects makes income changes "transitory or surprising" rather than "expected or
permanent" whereas we want to see the reaction of consumption to the latter. A
larger coe?cient in the fixed e?ects model relative to the random e?ects model may
reflect this possibility.
A coe?cient of 0.09 or higher is roughly consistent with the values suggested
by previous studies for many countries. According to the previous literature, about
9% of all households are rule-of-thumb consumers. However, we will show soon that
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comparing coe?cients in this way is not meaningful. Although there is variation
in the magnitude of the coe?cients, the test implications are the same: the Euler
equation implication is rejected. Households do not smooth consumption changes
over even expected income changes.
4.2 Do Borrowing Constraints Matter?
Most of the past literature attributes the violation of the Euler equation implication
to the existence of borrowing constraints. Using this analogy, the coe?cient of
expected income changes, such as the 0.09 value shown in Table 7, is sometimes
interpreted as the share of constrained households. The 0.09 value is consistent
with our earlier finding that 8 to 15 percent of our sample is actually constrained.
If the existence of borrowing constraints is the reason for the violation of the Euler
equation implication, we would expect to find that the Euler equation implication is
applicable or close to applicable in the sample of unconstrained households. Table
8 shows the results for the sample of unconstrained households, and as this table
shows, the coe?cient of expected income changes stays at about the same magnitude
and significance level. The di?erence in the coe?cients of expected income changes
between the full and unconstrained samples is quite small and not significant at a 1
percent significance level (see the bottom row of Table 8). Thus, the Euler equation
does not hold even for unconstrained households, which suggests that the existence
of borrowing constraints is not the reason for the violation of the Euler equation
implication7.
7Ideally, we would have liked to estimate the Euler equation for the sample of borrowing con-
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Many past studies that identify unconstrained households using the level of the
asset-income ratio make the conclusions even more ambiguous. In the previous sec-
tion, we found that splitting the sample by the asset-income ratio itself is question-
able, especially when we are interested in the behavior of unconstrained households.
In addition to this problem, the sensitivity of consumption to expected income
changes as measured by the above type of Euler equation does not show what pro-
portion of households are borrowing-constrained. Nonetheless, the results obtained
in this paper suggest that the existence of borrowing constraints is not the primary
cause of the violation of Euler equation implication.
4.3 Other Possible Explanations
If borrowing constraints are not the explanation, what is the explanation for the
violation of the Euler equation implication? First of all, the existence of future
constraints may a?ect the results. Our definition of constrained households does
not include the possibility of future constraints. As Hayashi (1997) emphasizes,
the current consumption of households that predict that they will face borrowing
constraints in the future will be sensitive to income changes. Unfortunately, we
cannot identify households who expect to be constrained in the future from among
currently unconstrained households.
Other data problems are also possible explanations of the rejection of the Euler
strained households also in order to see if the implication of the Euler equation was violated more
strongly for this sample, as expected, but unfortunately, we were not able to do so because the sam-
ple of borrowing constrained households was too small. Wakabayashi and Horioka (2005) test the
implication of the Euler equation for the full sample and for the sample of borrowing-constrained
households and find that it holds for the full sample but not for the sample of borrowing-constrained
households.
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equation implication. If we did not have data on total consumption but only on con-
sumption of a certain good, we would need to assume separability between goods. If
we could not obtain the appropriate micro data to test the Euler equation implica-
tion, we would have to assume that aggregation were possible. If we could not find
valid instruments in the limited information set, the stochastic structure of income
would be misspecified. The last problem is related to informational constraints on
households. However, these problems are not so serious in the present analysis.
Our consumption data is total consumption expenditure, and moreover, our data
set contains data on a large number and variety of household attributes, making it
easier to find appropriate instruments.
The existence of consumption durability is another possible explanation of the re-
jection of the Euler equation implication. If a commodity is durable and expenditure
on that commodity is increased in the current period, expenditure will be depressed
in the next period even though the household is still enjoying the consumption ser-
vices from that commodity. Households can derive benefits from consuming now
rather than later, thereby showing excess sensitivity of consumption8. In this case,
the error term in Eq. (2) will contain the e?ects of past consumption and will be
correlated with the explanatory variables (Mankiw (1982), Hayashi (1985b, 1999)).
However, this problem is less serious in our case partly because our consumption
measure consists primarily of non-durables and services and partly because the sur-
vey we use measures consumption in two 1-month time periods 1 year apart).
8Habit formation is another example of nonseparable consumption over time. In this case,
consumption must increase over time and households try to save now for future consumption,
showing excess smoothness of consumption.
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The existence of precautionary saving or di?erences in households’ level of uncer-
tainty is another possible explanation of the violation of the Euler equation impli-
cation. Our basic estimation model excludes this possibility by assuming that time
and individual fixed e?ects can control for it, which may be too strong an assump-
tion. The JPSC does not have information on overall uncertainty, and although we
estimate the implication including consumption variances, this may not be enough
to control for household’s risk-related behavior.
Finally, the misspecification of the theoretical assumption that consumption and
leisure are separable is another possible explanation for the violation of the Euler
equation implication. Unless this assumption is imposed, we cannot derive our Euler
equation test, which presupposes that the consumption decision is made indepen-
dently of the leisure decision. The JPSC contains information on individual’s time
allocation, but it is inappropriate to examine the Euler equation implication us-
ing leisure time in the above type of income-added-test since changes in leisure are
probably correlated with changes in income.
Thus, the possibility of precautionary behavior in the face of uncertainty and
that of inseparability between consumption and leisure remain as topics for future
research.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we used micro data on young married households from the Japanese
Panel Survey of Consumers, conducted by the Institute of Research on Household
20
Economics, to shed light on (1) the prevalence of borrowing constraints in Japan,
(2) what households are borrowing-constrained in Japan, (3) whether the life cy-
cle/permanent income hypothesis (LCPIH) holds in Japan, and (4) whether the
presence of borrowing constraints is the reason why the LCPIH does not hold in
Japan. To summarize our main findings, we found (1) that 8-15 percent of young
married Japanese households are borrowing-constrained, (2) that household assets
and the husband’s educational attainment are the most important determinants
of whether or not a household is borrowing-constrained, and (3) that the Euler
equation implication is rejected for both the full sample and for the subsample of
unconstrained households. These results suggest that the LCPIH does not apply in
Japan and that the presence of borrowing constraints is not the main reason why it
does not apply.
We turn finally to the implications of our findings for the causes of the prolonged
slowdown of the Japanese economy in the 1990s (the so-called "lost decade"). Many
studies have found that the prolonged slowdown exacerbated the borrowing con-
straints of firms, which in turn caused them to cut back on their investment, hiring,
and R&D (see, for example, Ogawa (2003), but the impact of the slowdown on house-
holds via borrowing constraints does not appear to have been as pronounced. We
did find that there was a sharp increase in the proportion of borrowing-constrained
households during the 1990s, but even after the increase, the proportion of borrow-
ing constrained households was less than one-sixth, and moreover, our estimation
results imply that the consumption behavior of borrowing constrained household
is not fundamentally any di?erent from the consumption behavior of unconstrained
21
households. Thus, it does not appear that the exacerbation of borrowing constraints
on households was an important determinant of the stagnation of household con-
sumption during the prolonged slowdown (see Horioka (2006) for a discussion of
what were the main causes of the stagnation of household consumption during this
period), and moreover, Horioka (2006) finds that the stagnation of household con-
sumption contributed far less to the prolonged slowdown than the stagnation of
private fixed investment.
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Table 3. Who Is Constrained?
Dependent Variable: "Constrained" =1 if either rejected, reduced, or discouraged.
Marginal Effects Marginal Effects Marginal Effects
(standard error) (standard error) (standard error)
HusAge 0.0029 0.0061 -0.0505 ***
(0.0054) (0.0121) (0.0139)
HusAge*HusAge 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 ***
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Income 0.0019 0.0331 0.0152
(0.0126) (0.0210) (0.0260)
Income-squared 0.0001 0.0005 * 0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Income*HusAge -0.0001 -0.0011 * -0.0005
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Asset -0.0329 ** -0.0038 -0.0773 ***
(0.0156) (0.0246) (0.0240)
Asset-squared 0.0000 0.0002 *** 0.0003 **
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Asset*Income 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Asset*HusAge 0.0005 -0.0003 0.0012 ***
(0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0006)
HusCollege -0.0280 ** -0.0404 *** -0.0388 *
(0.0121) (0.0155) (0.0231)
HusEmployed -0.1139 -0.0100 -0.0184
(0.1722) (0.0687) (0.0785)
NumFamily 0.0047 0.0001 -0.0026
(0.0034) (0.0057) (0.0077)
Homeown -0.0233 * -0.0017 -0.0308
(0.0133) (0.0187) (0.0300)
Debt 0.0520 0.1755 *** -0.0346
(0.0447) (0.0700) (0.1040)
AreaScale_med -0.0230 ** -0.0024 -0.0399
(0.0119) (0.0174) (0.0268)
AreaScale_small -0.0191 ** -0.0215 -0.0544 **
(0.0084) (0.0193) (0.0261)
Number of obs (households) 670 958 831
Log likelihood -140.29 -259.07 -288.66
Likelihood Ratio 80.12 74.30 136.73
McFadden's Adjusted Index 0.089 0.044 0.124
Normalized AIC 328.588 566.13 625.32
Partial effect on the probability of being constrained (evaluated at the means)
Asset -0.0155 -0.0172 -0.0225
Notes
1. The marginal effects evaluated at the means are shown. 
2. For the definitions of the variables, see the text and the notes to Table 2.
3. AreaScale_med and AreaScale_small are dummy variables indicating that the household 
   lives in medium-sized and small-sized cities, respectively, rather than in a metropolitan
   area.  Metropolitan areas denote the thirteen ordinance-designated cities. 
4. The equation also includes seven regional dummies.
5. We obtain similar results when we replace Asset with broader definitions of assets such as the sum of the
    paid-in value of life and non-life insurance and the value of land and housing in addition to total holdings of 
    bank and postal deposits, bonds, and equities.
1993 1998 2003
6. * indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significant at the 5% level, and *** indicates significant at the 1%
level.
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Appendix. (1) Prediction of Income Changes for Table 7
Dependent Variable: Change in log income 
Income change(t-1) -0.6004 *** -0.6192 *** -0.5637 *** -0.4538 ***
(0.0161) (0.0174) (0.0143) (0.0154)
Income change(t-2) -0.3255 *** -0.3329 *** -0.2931 *** -0.2030 ***
(0.0167) (0.0178) 0.0146 (0.0155)
HusAge -0.0161 0.0028 -0.0027 -0.0029 ***
(0.0159) (0.0038) (0.0020) (0.0009)
Family size change 0.0251 ** 0.0385 *** 0.0172 *** 0.0077 **
(0.0115) (0.0139) (0.0064) (0.0035)
HusAge*HusCollege -0.0064 -0.0088 0.0003 0.0002
(0.0052) (0.0057) (0.0006) (0.0002)
Consumption variance 0.0014 0.0013 **
(0.0010) (0.0005)
Constant 0.7181 -0.0921 0.1007 0.1364
(0.6573) (0.1433) (0.0817) (0.0399)
Number of observations 4582 3864 4582 3864
Test for indiv.effects: Ui=0 1.01 1.06 --- ---
Test for all coefficients=0 142.31 *** 130.44 *** 1584.00 *** 898.00 ***
R-squared 0.2852 0.3064 --- ---
?ui --- --- 0.488 0.000
?vit 0.294 0.289 0.426 0.415
Note: See the notes to Table 7.
(2) Prediction of Income Changes for Table 8
Dependent Variable: Change in log income. 
Income change(t-1) -0.5954 *** -0.6075 *** -0.4592 *** -0.4517 ***
(0.0171) (0.0185) (0.0155) (0.0163)
Income change(t-2) -0.3301 *** -0.3343 -0.2236 *** -0.2145 ***
(0.0179) (0.0192) (0.0162) (0.0173)
HusAge -0.0159 0.0012 -0.0022 *** -0.0028 ***
(0.0165) (0.0040) (0.0009) (0.0010)
Family size change 0.0272 ** 0.0434 *** 0.0117 *** 0.0098 ***
(0.0117) (0.0142) (0.0033) (0.0036)
HusAge*HusCollege -0.0073 -0.0087 0.0005 ** 0.0003
(0.0054) (0.0059) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Consumption variance 0.0015 0.0014 ***
(0.0011) (0.0005)
Constant 0.8725 -0.0484 0.0867 ** 0.1150 ***
(0.6609) (0.1487) (0.0369) (0.0413)
Number of observations 4133 3463 4133 3463
Test for indiv.effects: Ui=0 1.04 1.08 --- ---
Test for all coefficients=0 123.50 *** 110.88 *** 920.00 *** 803.00 ***
R-squared 0.281 0.299 --- ---
?ui --- --- 0.006 0.000
?vit 0.289 0.282 0.424 0.415
Note:  See the notes to Table 8.
(a) IV with fixed effects (b) IV with random effects
(a) IV with fixed effects (b) IV with random effects
??
